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ABSTRACT 
This article examines how Palestinians in France, Sweden and the UK negotiate, mobilise 
and/or resist, and ultimately problematise, notions of statelessness as a concept and as a 
marker of identity. Centralising Palestinians’ conceptualisations in this manner – 
including accounts which directly challenge academics’ and policy-makers’ definitions of 
the problem of, and solution to, statelessness - is particularly important given that 
statelessness emerges as both a condition and a label which erase the ability to speak, and 
be heard. The article draws on the narratives of 46 Palestinians to examine perceptions of 
statelessness as a marker of rightlessess, home(land)lessness and voicelessness. It then 
explores statelessness through the paradigm of the ‘threshold’, reflecting both on 
interviewees’ ambiguity towards this label, status and condition, and the extent to which 
even Palestinians who hold citizenship remain ‘on the threshold of statelessness’. It 
concludes by reflecting on interviewees’ rejection of a label which is imposed upon them 
‘from a distance’ via bureaucratic processes which reproduce, rather than redress, 
processes of erasure and dispossession. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Statelessness – the condition of holding no nationality and therefore being without the 
protection of a state – has been ‘rediscovered’ by academics, policy-makers and 
practitioners since the 2000s (Van Waas 2008; Edwards and Van Waas 2014). In part, 
this is related to the 60th anniversary of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness and the 50th anniversary of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons in 2011 and 2014 respectively. Advocacy campaigns and policy reports 
related to these anniversaries – including numerous Mapping Statelessness reports, the 
2014 First Global Forum on Statelessness and the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees’ 2014 I Belong campaign - have highlighted the extent to which 
statelessness is effectively synonymous with individual and collective vulnerability to 
marginalization and human rights abuses, asserting that there is an urgent need to ‘solve’ 
situations of statelessness. In particular, the United Nations, NGOs and government 
ministries recognise that the main ‘solution’ is for stateless people to secure a nationality 
and state protection from their country of origin or their country of habitual residence 
(UNHCR 2014). To achieve this ‘solution’, and to prevent future cases of statelessness, 
states should become signatories to the above-mentioned Conventions, implement 
appropriate reforms to their nationality laws and/or apply their existing laws without 
discrimination, and establish statelessness determination procedures if they do not yet 
Pre-publication version of article accepted for publication in the Journal of Ethnic 
and Racial Studies (2016) 
exist in order to identity stateless people (ibid). 
 
Stateless people’s experiences of rightlessness and vulnerability have thus now been 
extensively acknowledged, and a range of mechanisms have been promoted to secure 
legal redress, including through ‘identification’ procedures. However, precisely how 
individuals and groups who are defined in these terms by academics, policy-makers and 
practitioners themselves engage with, experience, accept and/or reject such labels and 
policy categories remains under-examined to date. This is in direct contrast to analyses 
conducted within the related field of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (i.e. Zetter 
1991, 1997; Gupte and Mehta 2007; Ludwig 2013). Inter alia, these argue that asylum-
seekers strive to be recognised as refugees in order to obtain international protection and 
opportunities for resettlement to a country in the global North, and yet certain groups 
may simultaneously reject the ‘refugee label’ as an imposed bureaucratic category 
charged with stigmatizing and insulting connotations which constitute them as  “stupid, 
misfits, ignorant, poor and uncivilized” (Kumsa 2006: 242). 
 
In many regards, it is unsurprising that there are no such studies vis-à-vis ‘the stateless 
label’ given that “the study of statelessness emerged as the study of nationality law” 
(Manly and van Waas 2014:5) and the majority of academic literature on statelessness 
has subsequently primarily been developed from the perspective of international law 
(ibid). Indeed, it is only recently that a space has emerged in academia for personal and 
political reflections on this label to complement, and at times challenge, the official 
discourses developed by academics and policy-makers (Redclift 2013; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 
2014). 
 
In addition to the relationship between ‘statelessness studies’ and nationality law, the 
rediscovery of the concept and legal category of statelessness is also often historically 
situated vis-à-vis Hannah Arendt’s denunciation of this condition as the very absence of 
the “right to have rights” (1951); related studies correspondingly explore the relationship 
between statelessness and political exclusion and inclusion from the perspective of 
political theory (cf. Staples 2012:14-15). Such an approach has itself been critiqued by 
those, such as Rancière (2004:299), who argue that Arendt’s theorisation of statelessness 
provides “a frame of description and a line of argumentation that later would prove quite 
effective for depoliticizing matters of power and repression and setting them in a sphere 
of exceptionality that is no longer political, in an anthropological sphere of sacrality 
situated beyond the reach of political dissensus.” In effect, as noted by Vali (1998:85), 
 
In the political discourse of modernity, statelessness is conceived as a 
humanitarian issue, evoking compassion and mercy, on a par with famine, hunger 
and homelessness. This is because a consideration of statelessness as politics and 
the stateless as a ‘political subject’ immediately invokes the thorny issue of rights, 
which in the political discourse of modernity, is intrinsically linked with the 
institution of the nation-state and national sovereignty. 
 
‘Vulnerable’ stateless people are therefore constituted as ideal victims who are to be 
supported by modern global campaigns to fulfill their ‘belonging’ in the world – to return 
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them to a sphere where they have ‘the right to have rights’. In contrast, the stateless 
person as a ‘political subject’ demanding not only individual but collective, and indeed 
national, rights, defining the terms of their own inclusion or exclusion from international 
debates and agendas, or determining the meaning(s) which statelessness may or may not 
have for them on individual and collective levels, has been placed on the margins of this 
paradigm.   
 
This article addresses these lacunae by drawing on the narratives of 45 Palestinians 
interviewed in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom between 2012 and 2014, to 
examine how they negotiate, mobilise and/or resist, and ultimately problematise, notions 
of statelessness as a concept and as a marker of identity. Drawing on these narratives, the 
paper thus transcends the focus on documenting the ‘lived experiences’ of statelessness 
as personal experiences of vulnerability – which has been critiqued for reducing stateless 
people to apolitical victims on the margins of politics and of the polis (op cit) - by 
examining how research participants conceptualise statelessness on abstract, personal and 
political levels alike. Centralising the voices of Palestinians in this way – including 
accounts which directly challenge the ways in which academics and policy-makers have 
defined the problem of, and solution to, statelessness - is particularly important given the 
extent to which statelessness is itself understood as both a condition and a label which 
erase the ability to speak, and be heard.  
 
Methodological Note 
This paper forms part of a broader comparative project funded by the Leverhulme Trust, 
which aims to reconceptualise individual and collective meanings of statelessness from 
the perspectives of EU-based Roma, Kurds and Palestinians – as three groups which for a 
variety of historical reasons have no independent and internationally-recognised state of 
their own.i Inter alia, the broader project analyses the ways in which Palestinians and 
Kurds who hold a wide diversity of legal statuses in the EU conceptualise connections 
with other members of ‘their’ communities across time and space, and socio-political 
commitments to their respective homelands in the Middle East (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 
2014).  
 
The research aimed to capture the heterogeneity of Palestinians in Europe, with 
interviewees consisting of 27 men and 18 women aged between 18 and 70. Interviewees 
had arrived in France, Sweden or the UK between 1973 and 2012, and held a wide range 
of legal statuses in these countries at the time of interview.  
 
UK (N= 14) Sweden (N = 10) France (N = 21) Total (N = 45) 
 
11 British 
citizenship 
1 Refugee status 
1 Palestinian 
passport  
1 US citizenship on 
student visa 
10 Swedish citizenship 
 
10 French nationality 
2 Refugee Status  
3 Stateless Status  
2 Israeli citizenship, 1 
on student visa 
2 Temporary 
residency 
35 Citizen 
3 Refugee 
3 Stateless 
2 Palestinian 
passport holder 
2 Temporary 
resident 
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 1 Palestinian passport 
on student visa 
 
Figure 1. Legal statuses held by research participants at the time of interview 
 
Indeed, France, Sweden and the UK were selected as the core field-sites for this project 
both in light of Palestinians’ diverse migration histories and trajectories to different EU 
states, but also in order to examine how the different migration and citizenship regimes in 
these countries inform interviewees’ conceptualizations of statelessness. Of particular 
relevance for this article, and as explored below, France has a well-established 
statelessness determination procedure implemented by the Office Francais de Protection 
des Réfugiés et Apatrides (OFPRA), which explains why the interviewees who held 
official stateless status at the time of research were all interviewed in France. In contrast, 
no interviewees held (or had formerly held) stateless status in the UK, since that country 
only introduced a formal statelessness determination process in April 2013. In turn, all 
interviewees in Sweden were Swedish citizens, which many interviewees argued should 
be viewed in light of Sweden having historically offered a more expedited mechanism to 
secure citizenship than those processes available through either the UK’s or France’s 
immigration and citizenship regimes. 
 
Although four interviewees were born in Europe to (one or both) Palestinian parents, the 
interviewees’ current and former legal status(es) in Europe partly depended on the 
‘home’ context across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) from which they and 
their families had migrated. Interviewees’ wide-ranging points of origin correlated not 
only with the diverse legal statuses they had held in MENA before arriving in the EU, but 
also their means of entering and remaining in France, Sweden or the UK. For instance, 
those interviewees who had been registered with the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) as Palestine refugees in 
Lebanon, Syria and Jordan typically applied for asylum or stateless status upon arrival in 
the EU, while a number of the interviewees who held Palestinian passports or were 
Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel had been able to secure student or work visas to enter 
and/or remain in the EU. In all countries, a small number of interviewees had married 
European citizens and had been naturalised after the relevant residence requirements had 
been met. Ultimately, interviewees’ experiences and understandings of statelessness were 
influenced in different ways both by these pre-existing and evolving legal statuses, and 
by the conditions under which they and their families had lived in the MENA region 
before arriving in the EU.  
 
PALESTINIANS’ STATELESSNESS AND RE-STATING THE RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION  
UNHCR has an ‘international’ mandate vis-à-vis refugees, and yet Palestinian refugees 
have historically been excluded from its remit due to Article 1(d) of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which specifies that “This Convention 
shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the 
United Nations other than the [UNHCR] protection or assistance.” The only UN agency 
to which this pertains is UNRWA, which provides assistance (but not protection) to the 
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majority of Palestinians in the Middle East. As a result, although Palestinians are 
registered as ‘Palestine refugees’ within UNRWA’s five areas of operation (Gaza, the 
West Bank, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria), they have largely been excluded from the 
‘international refugee regime’ (Akram, 2014). Unable to benefit from the services and 
protection of UNHCR in the Middle East, Palestinians have also often been excluded 
from refugee status determination procedures in the global North due a mis-application of 
Article 1(d), and they have also typically remained invisible in global statistics vis-à-vis 
forced migration. With Palestinian refugees often framed as ‘exceptions’ from the 
international ‘refugee norm’, this leads us to consider to what extent Palestinians are 
conceptualized as being stateless by UNHCR (and international law), before turning to 
the perspectives of Palestinian interviewees themselves.  
 
In light of the above, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 5 million Palestinians who are 
stateless under international law were nonetheless excluded in 2014 from UNHCR’s ‘I 
Belong’ campaign and its ‘global’ statistics on statelessness. This decision was justified 
by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees on the basis that the Palestinian State has 
been recognized by the UN General Assembly and that the solution to Palestinians’ 
statelessness is the implementation of appropriate nationality laws, denominating this a 
“very specific situation” requiring a “political solution” (Guterres in Larson, 2014).  
 
Palestinians’ statelessness does indeed require a “political solution,” and yet categorizing 
it as a “very specific situation” reiterates the extent to which Palestinians ‘do not belong,’ 
but continue to be positioned as ‘exceptions’ to be excluded from the international 
statelessness agenda. Furthermore, positing that the Palestinian context requires a 
“political solution” depoliticises other contexts of statelessness by suggesting that these 
can readily be addressed through apolitical technical and legal mechanisms (Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh, 2014).  
 
UNHCR’s decision to exclude Palestinians from its campaign and statistics has been 
criticised by the Institute of Statelessness and Inclusion (ISI, 2014), which has noted that, 
although not all Palestinians necessarily fall under UNHCR’s statelessness protection 
mandate, a large proportion at present are, and an unknown number in future will be, 
under UNHCR’s mandate even after Palestine is fully recognised as a State, its territorial 
borders and territorial sovereignty have been determined, and its national legislation has 
been implemented. As such, the Institute calls upon UNHCR to recognise its obligations 
towards these Palestinians in the present and future, rather than reproducing their 
exclusion from the international protection regime. 
 
The contours of the question of statelessness in the Palestinian context were expounded 
by a leading UNHCR official interviewed for this project, who started by identifying the 
emergence of the state of Israel as being at the root of Palestinians’ protracted 
refugeedom, before discussing the relationship between the absence of the Palestinian 
state and Palestinians’ ongoing statelessness:  
 
Palestine is a situation of state succession … the creation of the state of Israel, and 
the implementation of the Israeli nationality law to certain populations but not 
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others, has resulted in the fact that [Palestinians] have become refugees… UN 
resolutions are very clear about the creation of two states, Israel and Palestine. 
[However], despite the international community’s efforts, Palestine does not have 
the full status of a state. For now, those people are without a state since the state 
does not exist… Juridically, they could potentially become citizens of a state or 
nationals of a state but that [Palestinian] state does not exist yet with all of its 
prerogatives and so they are in a situation of statelessness…. 
Interview, France, 2012 
 
Identifying the establishment of an independent Palestinian state as a prerequisite to the 
solution of Palestinians’ statelessness, the UNHCR official further clarified that “the 
entire role of the United Nations is to help ensure that these people no longer be stateless 
and become nationals of the Palestinian state”. The international community therefore has 
a clear obligation to assist Palestinians to become Palestinian nationals, even when the 
“juridical” possibility of Palestinians becoming citizens or nationals of a second state 
exists.  
 
The complex relationship between the granting of non-Palestinian nationality/citizenship 
and Palestinians’ Right of Return – a right enshrined in UN Resolutions 194 and 3236ii -  
has been central to debates regarding the fair and just treatment of Palestinians across the 
Middle East since the 1950, with most MENA states, the Palestinian Authority, and many 
Palestinian political factions holding that granting a non-Palestinian nationality to 
Palestinian individuals, families and collectives would weaken the Right of Return. As 
maintained by the above-cited UNHCR representative, although a large proportion of the 
5 million Palestinians in the region are de jure stateless,iii “this does not mean that all 
Palestinians are necessarily stateless because a number of them as you know, in Jordan, 
have received Jordanian nationality” (emphasis added). When asked to clarify whether, 
officially, Palestinians who hold Jordanian and Israeli nationality would no longer be 
considered to be stateless, he answered 
 
Yes… [and] there are many more because there are French Palestinians, 
American [Palestinians]… whole groups of people who become [nationals], 
thanks to the laws in the country in which they are living… If a Palestinian child, 
a Palestinian refugee is born in the US, well he automatically acquires American 
nationality, for example. So there is a whole group of Palestinians who are not 
stateless, those in Jordan, those in Israel, and of course, those who are in many 
countries around the world of which they have acquired the nationality. 
Emphasis added.  
 
Of particular relevance for the remainder of this paper is the way in which statelessness is 
conceptualized by different actors in light of the apparent disconnect between the 
international community’s obligation to assist Palestinians to become Palestinian 
nationals, and the assumption that “of course,” those who have acquired the nationality of 
a second or third country are no longer stateless. While it is clear that ‘Nationality 
Matters’iv in so far as granting ‘a’ nationality ‘resolves’ de jure statelessness, the 
remainder of this article examines how Palestinian interviewees conceptualise their status 
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and statelessness both in the Middle East and in the European diaspora. In particular, it 
examines their perceptions of statelessness as a marker of rightlessness, 
home(land)lessness and voicelessness which is simultaneously embraced and yet resisted 
as an ambiguous label, status and condition imposed upon them through a range of 
political and bureaucratic processes.  
 
Marking Rightless, Home(land)less and Voiceless  
In many regards, interviewees’ narratives echo the three losses resulting from 
statelessness traced by Arendt: the loss of home (exile), the loss of state protection (basic 
rights), and the absence of a place in the world (political rights). Their accounts therefore 
highlight not only the vulnerability faced by Palestinians precisely due to the lack of state 
protection and the inability to seek one’s basic and political rights, but also centralize the 
loss of home and homeland. This is particularly significant given that literature pertaining 
to statelessness rarely acknowledges that the homeland – which has remained central to 
conceptualisations and theorisations of diasporic identity - is often as central to 
understandings of statelessness, and at times even more so, than the loss of the state or 
nationality. 
 
With regards to the paradigm of rightlessness, 70-year-old Abbas Shiblak, who was born 
in Haifa and has written extensively on statelessness in the MENA region (ie Shiblak 
1996), summarized the socio-legal implications of being stateless as follows: “You are 
no-one. It’s like a ship with no flag. You are not protected. You are exposed” (interview, 
UK, 2013). Likewise, 63-year-old Ahmed, who was born in Umm Khalid, equated 
statelessness with being a “zero”: “you do not have an identity, a personality, an 
existence” (interview, Sweden, 2014). In his interview, Ahmed continued to explore the 
dual characteristics of lacking an identity and protection, by arguing that: 
An orphan is better than a stateless person because you do not exist if you do not 
have a state. An orphan might have relatives that can take care of them but 
nobody embraces us. If you are stateless, it is like when nobody asks you if you 
are sick, hungry or thirsty. But when you have a state, you belong to a state that 
can care about you.  
 
The essence of being without state protection was further encapsulated by UK-based 
Jibril, who recounted his experiences of statelessness through the dual tropes of being 
unable to speak and of being inaudible. He explained his experiences of the latter by 
virtue of having no diplomatic representative to speak on his behalf: while the voice of 
his Italian-born wife was magnified by summoning her Ambassador to assist the couple 
when they were prevented from crossing an international border at a Spanish airport, 
Jibril has no nationality and, by extension, no voice. His statelessness was effectively 
interpellated by proxy, since at the moment that his wife’s ‘presence’ and audibility as a 
citizen was reinforced through this encounter at/through the border, so too was Jibril’s 
‘absence’ marked (40-year-old born in a refugee camp in Jordan; interview, UK, 2013).  
 
These accounts of disenfranchisement thus echo two key absences: having no state to 
‘project’ your voice, and simultaneously having no home in the world and thereby being 
unable to enjoy basic rights. The interconnected experiences of voicelessness and 
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homelessness were also central to Laith’s understanding of statelessness: 
 
Being homeless, in a way. Homeless on a global scale. Not having an obvious 
place where you can seek your rights. In today’s political situation, states provide 
a voice to people. States are responsible for giving basic rights to people. So 
[statelessness is] having no place to claim those rights… On a collective level, 
people want to have a voice. And having a state, not being stateless, projects that 
voice. 
21-year-old born in Nablus. Interview, UK, 2013 
 
These references to voicelessness do not mean to say that individuals cannot speak, but 
rather that the support of a state is needed for this voice to be “projected” and heard by 
Others; having a voice, Laith asserted, ultimately means not only expressing an opinion, 
but “Being able to enact change”, to change “something that I do not think is fair.”  
 
Agreeing with the assertion that being stateless means that people are unable to change 
their lives or claim their rights, Miriyam – a 42-year-old born in Nazareth - posited that: 
 
Not having your own homeland, your own state, is to be subjected to others’ 
mercy, to be subjected to others’ ferocity ... You can’t create the future that you 
want, so you don’t live life to its fullest...  
Interview, France, 2012 
 
Just as Ahmed and Laith drew attention to the absence of an internationally-recognised 
Palestinian state and of being ‘homeless’, Miriyam also argued that stateless people are 
unable to make decisions about their own future, and are “subjected to others’ mercy” or 
“ferocity,” simultaneously because of the absence of the Palestinian state and the absence 
of the Palestinian homeland.  
 
In their accounts, statelessness is thus simultaneously a legal, a political, and an 
existential condition. Although legal definitions of statelessness centralise nationality and 
state protection, interviewees such as Laith and Miriyam presented the Palestinian 
homeland – one of the key defining features in understandings of diasporic identity – as 
being as important to their understanding of statelessness, and at times even more 
important, than the absence of a nationality and state protection. Importantly, Ahmed, 
Jibril, Laith and Miriyam all identified themselves as stateless even though they hold one 
or more nationalities: for instance, Laith is a British citizen who also holds a Palestinian 
passport and a West Bank identity document, and Miriyam has both Israeli nationality 
and French citizenship. Legally speaking, they are not classified as ‘stateless people’ in 
the EU given that they are citizens, and yet they consider themselves to ‘be’ stateless on a 
collective level.  
 
By highlighting the multiple dimensions of statelessness, including the lack of rights and 
state protection, but also the sense of being home(land)less and voiceless, they continue 
to identify themselves as stateless. They therefore challenge policy-makers’ assumptions 
that being granted ‘a’ nationality is the official solution to statelessness. Likewise, 25-
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year-old Paris-born Mahmoud argued that all Palestinians in the world are stateless, 
whether they hold ‘a’ nationality or not: “Simply from the fact of being Palestinian…we 
know we are apatride. We are a people without a homeland (sans patrie). We would like 
to be reunited with our homeland (retrouver notre patrie)…” (interview, France, 2012). 
In his view, Palestinians’ statelessness cannot be ‘solved’ by granting ‘a’ nationality 
since the relationship with the Palestinian homelandv remains a contested one; rather, 
statelessness will only be resolved when a specific state (Palestine) grants a specific 
(Palestinian) nationality. Through this concise statement, Mahmoud thereby directly 
equates Palestinian-ness with being stateless in the sense of being separated from the 
homeland, even when holding one of more citizenships.vi 
 
On the Threshold of Statelessness 
A further dimension disrupting the assumption that holding ‘a’ nationality necessarily 
resolves statelessness is grounded in Palestinians’ experiences of nationality being 
fraught with insecurity, rather than offering security. For instance, Palestinians who held 
Jordanian nationality have repeatedly been stripped of their nationality and rendered 
stateless once again (HRW 2010), and Molavi refers to the dual policies of exclusion and 
inclusion that constitute Palestinian citizens of Israel as “stateless citizens” (2013). 
Through a process of what we can understand as ‘travelling fear’ (following Said, 
1983:226-247; also Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013), Marwa – a 30-year-old born in a refugee 
camp in Syria - referred to the constant fear of being stripped of one’s nationality, a fear 
that has travelled with her from the Middle East to Europe: “The fear becomes part of 
your identity because wherever you go, you are not fully accepted. Sweden can today be 
the perfect partner but still there is a fear that this relationship can change and end” 
(interview, Sweden, 2014). The potential for expulsion from the country that has granted 
you nationality whilst hosting you as a guest was also stressed by 33-year-old Faisal, who 
was born in a refugee camp in Lebanon; he was concerned that there was no “guarantee 
that the next president or government will not do the same thing as previous 
governments... Palestinians probably think that Sweden can one day have a racist 
government and can deport them” (interview, Sweden, 2014). This resonates clearly with 
the concept hostipitality so astutely theorised by Derrida (2000), highlighting that 
“hospitality” is always “parasitized by its opposite, ‘hostility’, the undesirable guest 
which it harbours as the self-contradiction within its own body” (ibid:3). As such, 
hospitality itself inherently bears “its opposite” but also its own opposition, the ever-
present possibility of hostility towards the Other who has, at one time, been welcomed at 
the threshold, and yet, “Perhaps no one welcomed is ever completely welcome” (ibid:6; 
see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015:109). Interviewees’ fears and all they represent suggest that 
even when holding ‘a’ citizenship, many Palestinians continue to be on, or to embody, 
what I refer to as ‘the threshold of statelessness’ (also Qasmiyeh 2014). 
However, as a zone within which “we witness a constant shifting from one condition to 
another, neither of which is definable once and for all” (Vighi et al 2014:viii), the 
threshold also captures the ambivalence expressed by those interviewees such as Feiruz, 
an 18-year-old born in Gaza who did not identify with the term ‘stateless’ on either 
personal or political levels, and yet continued to recognise themselves as simultaneously 
stateless and not stateless: 
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When I think about statelessness, what comes to mind is being without rights and 
being deprived of my homeland. I understand that we Palestinians are stateless 
because we were expelled from our homeland but that is different from saying 
that I do not have any homeland at all since we still have Palestine. I am both 
stateless and not stateless. 
Interview, Sweden, 2014. Emphasis added  
 
Recognizing that their expulsion and dispossession from Palestine have rendered them 
stateless, Feiruz nonetheless resists the term precisely because it denotes the absence of a 
homeland whose existence she asserts. This resistance does not result in an absolute 
rejection of either ‘being’ or ‘not being’, but rather is expressed through a form of 
“complementarity” (Vighi et al, 2014:ix) which “includes both these conditions within its 
own space” (ibid:viii): simultaneously a citizen and a stateless person; both with(in) and 
without Palestine; a cipher who is both no-one and some-one. 
 
Whilst echoing this ambivalence, Mahmoud redefined the terms of complementarity in 
order to transcend the binary represented by this overlapping rejection and acceptance of 
the label and condition of statelessness. On the one hand, he asserted that “I don’t really 
consider myself to be stateless. Because to consider myself as such would really mean 
that we have lost the struggle, [that] the country doesn’t really exist any more, that there 
really isn’t any hope for return,” and yet, “as a matter of fact, yes, I am stateless.” 
However, ascribing to this status is only imaginable for Mahmoud if statelessness is itself 
redefined to centralise the continued “connection to Palestine”:  
 
In our case the term stateless should mean that we are not on our land… what 
matters is the relationship to the land. Where one comes from. We are stateless 
because we are not on our land of origin and not because our state did not 
emerge after the carving up done by the League of Nations. 
Interview, France, 2012. Emphasis added 
 
This explicitly entails re-territorialising statelessness, demanding that this marker and 
process be recognised as reflecting neither the loss of an erased land nor the failed 
emergence of a state, but rather the ongoing resistance to the collective dispossession 
from the Palestinian homeland. This re-territorialisation of statelessness provides a 
reconfiguration both of space and time, and the corresponding reinscription of 
Palestinians in both of these (also Sanbar 2001:91-92). 
 
However, if Mahmoud and Fatima represent the threshold through the paradigm of 
“complementarity rather than opposition” (Vighi et al 2014:ix), with Mahmoud 
reconstituting the contours of that which is inside and outside of the very signifier 
‘stateless,’ other interviewees such as Kanaan reject the applicability or validity of this 
concept by reasserting the spatial and temporal specificity of the Palestinian threshold: 
 
I cannot accept the thought that we Palestinians are stateless… I know where my 
homeland is. We will claim it back. When, is another question... It is impossible 
for me to feel that I am stateless. I have never used the word stateless for myself. 
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28-year-old born in Germany. Interview, Sweden, 2014 
 
Kanaan thus opposes the discourse that constitutes Palestinians as quintessentially 
stateless since they have neither a state nor a homeland, precisely by asserting the 
presence (from a distance) of Palestine in the past, present and future, thereby contesting 
the processes which have erased Palestinians from time and space:  
 
By departing from space, the Palestinians, about whom the whole world agreed to 
say ‘they do not exist’, also departed from time. Their history and their past were 
denied. Their aspirations and their future were forbidden… Driven out of time 
and space, the Palestinians would ultimately see themselves as deprived of the 
right to their own name.   
Sanbar 2001:91-92 
 
The very denomination of a loss, or absence of a place in the world was rejected by other 
interviewees such as Sara and Saif, who were both born in refugee camps in Lebanon and 
were interviewed respectively in France and Sweden: 53-year-old Sara argued that the 
term stateless is itself “unjust because one cannot be ‘apatride.’ One still belongs to a 
place!” and 43-year-old Saif questioned its validity “because everyone comes from 
somewhere. Everyone has their roots somewhere.” Sara not only asserted that it was 
unjust, but also incorrect to use this term, stating that the word apatride itself “is not 
properly described, it is not properly constituted,” a concept that is itself only on the 
verge of meaning, lacking precision and nuance, and reproducing the impossible position 
of belonging nowhere. More vehemently, Abdel-Rahman denounced the label which he 
considered to be an “insult,” demanding that officials should recognize the country – 
Palestine – from which he originates (40-year-old born in Saudi Arabia; interview, UK, 
2013). The right to be recognized as originating from a country or a state – rather than 
being denied such an origin – therefore emerged as an essential, even existential, matter, 
with the denomination of statelessness being considered to be a form of epistemic 
violence.  
 
In effect, without the re-definition of the concept to “mean that we are not on our land” as 
proposed by Mahmoud (op cit), Nora considered that the label ‘stateless’ is itself a form 
of aggression since it denies a legitimate belonging to a particular space: 
 
As I became politically aware, I understood that I am stateless… but it’s not a 
term we speak about, like ‘it’s my identity, I am stateless.’ … It confiscates 
something from you, takes something from you by force. The whole terminology is 
imposed on you. I think it’s very aggressive as a term…It contains a lot of 
aggression. It reflects the aggression that’s coming from outside onto me, as my 
legal status, as being Palestinian, as having my passport, as not having the power 
to move... it’s… maybe the title of this aggression can be this statelessness. 
34-year-old born in Nablus. Interview, France, 2012. Emphasis added  
 
Even when she recognises that she and other Palestinians are stateless legally and 
politically speaking, Nora does not personally or politically identify with this concept; 
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rather, she feels that the label has been “imposed” upon her as an extension of the 
aggression that permeates her life. In this way, the label itself “confiscates” her ability to 
define herself or define what is present and absent in her life, concluding with a 
dialectical understanding of the relationship between statelessness and aggression.  
 
Repeatedly, this concept and label – officially designated to reflect the vulnerability of 
those who do not have the right to have rights – was identified as reproducing, rather than 
resolving, the invisibility, marginalisation and exclusion of Palestinians, effectively 
denying their very existence:  
 
For me there is no stateless [person]. It doesn’t mean anything. It’s like you are 
in front of me and I say you don’t exist… But ignoring somebody doesn’t mean 
he’s not here. He’s there. You are ignoring him but he’s there. 
64-year-old man born in Selet al-Dahar. Interview, France, 2012. Emphasis added 
 
The rejection of this term, and the exclusionary processes which it is perceived to 
reproduce rather than challenge, were also expanded upon by Razak, who highlighted the 
possible implications of adopting the statelessness label even on an individual level:  
 
[Stateless is] a term that affects dignity… If there comes a time when I can apply 
[for apatride status] I won’t do it. It’s so individualized…there is no collective 
notion behind it… We have a collective cause, not a cause that pertains to 
individuals… The individualization of the cause bothers me, because it’s a 
collective cause and individual cause, in both directions at the same time… You 
can’t separate them and you can’t individualize this cause. 
33-year-old born in Bethlehem. Interview, France, 2012  
 
Being aware of the possibility of applying for apatride status via France’s established 
statelessness determination procedure, Razak challenged the desirability of being legally 
recognised as a stateless person, reflecting the fear that when individual Palestinians are 
granted stateless status and are one step closer to being granted nationality, the possibility 
of achieving a meaningful collective solution becomes increasingly distant.  
 
STATELESS FROM A DISTANCE  
Importantly, interviewees repeatedly demonstrated that their awareness of the concept of 
statelessness, and of ‘being’ (or being considered by others to ‘be’) stateless had emerged 
from a geographical distance. In particular, this awareness arose through their own and 
others’ interactions with diverse institutions and administrative procedures, including 
immigration officers and when applying for asylum, but also when registering with 
educational establishments. A key distinction emerging in this regard is the extent to 
which statelessness was imposed by others as a nationality marker (rather than as a legal 
status preceding the granting of a nationality), in contrast with the process of consciously 
applying for apatride status as a means of securing protection in Europe. As noted above, 
such processes are well-established in countries like France, with its Office Francais de 
Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides (OFPRA), while countries such as the United 
Kingdom have only more recently introduced a formal statelessness determination 
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process (April 2013), even when the label as a marker of ‘nationality’ - even if not of 
protection - had existed long before then.  
 
In light of the increasing number of countries adopting statelessness determination 
procedures as a means of facilitating the ‘identification’ of stateless people, this 
distinction is highly significant since many Palestinians rejected being labelled as 
stateless through diverse administrative procedures. While perceived to be a first step in 
‘resolving’ statelessness, ‘becoming’ a ‘stateless’ person in the European diaspora 
through such a process of administrative interpellation has itself been experienced as a 
form of “erasure” and even “aggression” (op cit). This discussion therefore demonstrates 
the disjuncture which exists between the ways in which the label ‘stateless’ is 
conceptualised by academics, practitioners and policy makers on the one hand, and by 
those individuals and groups who are labelled as such by others. This is the ultimate 
paradox of a policy framework which has ostensibly been designed to redress the lack of 
the right to have rights, which was perceived by many of the research participants, 
including Reema, as erasing their very existence:  
 
I’m not ‘stateless’ [uses the English term]... I have my ‘state.’ For me, personally, 
I’m not like that. But in the eyes of others, I am... I have a friend who was in 
Norway. She had her residency permit, and [next to the category] ‘state,’ [there 
were] some asterisks, and then the word ‘stateless.’ On Facebook, she said: ‘Well, 
I’m stateless...’ It’s sad, but it’s sad for that state [Norway], that doesn’t 
recognize something that exists...  if you consider us ‘stateless’ [uses English 
word], too bad for you. We exist. 
25-year-old born in Ramallah. Interview, France, 2012. Emphasis added 
 
This is not to argue that Palestinians are not ‘stateless’ in either the juridical or political 
sense (as lacking a nationality or lacking an internationally recognised state), but rather to 
illustrate the need for a more nuanced engagement with the multiple meanings which this 
concept has for different stakeholders, including those whose disenfranchisement could 
be perceived to be magnified rather than overcome in Europe and further afield.  
 
In spite of their embodied experiences of marginalisation, discrimination and de jure 
statelessness in the Middle East, the administrative, and political, steps of replacing 
individuals’ Palestinian identity with the ‘nationality’ marker of XXA (the code for 
statelessness) in Europe was a traumatic event for a number of interviewees. In particular, 
Fatima, a woman in her 60s born in Galilee, offered a poignant account of the process of 
‘becoming’ stateless in the diaspora, differentiating between her experiences of being 
brought up in Shatila refugee camp in Lebanon and her arrival in the UK (interview, UK, 
2013). With reference to her childhood in Lebanon, she clarified that “I did not feel 
stateless. Or without an identity. I always felt I have an identity.” That identity was one 
with which she self-identified: “‘I am a refugee here and one day we will go to Palestine’. 
We were very enthusiastic, very hopeful… So I did not feel I was stateless.” In direct 
contrast, she recalled the moment in which she was first categorised by the British 
authorities as a stateless person:   
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When I went to register with the [British] police, they gave me that blue book… 
and they had written [her full name] and then [... for] nationality they put 
stateless… It blew me over: How come I am stateless? I went outside the police 
station and I was standing by the staircase and thinking what to do. Argue with 
that policeman? What do they mean by stateless? I have a state....   
  
It was at that instant that, for “the first time I felt I was stateless. I felt very bad. 
‘Stateless’ means someone who is not recognised, someone who is lost, someone up in 
the air… It means unfairness, injustice. It is inhuman.” The disbelief of being labelled 
stateless was overtaken by the emotional anguish of being denied not only her history, 
her identity and her sense of belonging to Palestine, but her very humanity, all within the 
country where she was seeking sanctuary.  
 
The grief characterizing the process of ‘becoming’ stateless in the UK was paralleled in 
Rana’s emotional account of having her Palestinian identity “erased” by the 
administration when she enrolled in a French university in 1982. At this point, her 
identity was documented as ‘stateless’ since “they didn’t find the code for Palestine,” and 
she was not Lebanese (also Boulatta 1998). In spite of Rana asking for her documents to 
identify her as a ‘refugee’ – on the basis that “at least [if they write] ‘Palestinian refugee,’ 
there is the word ‘Palestine’ in it” - it was only recently that her identity card had been 
marked “stateless of Palestinian origin”, ensuring that “the Palestinian is there, you can’t 
erase that…” (interview, France, 2012). Redefining statelessness in relation to the 
connection to Palestine, as demanded by Mahmoud (op cit), ensured the reconstitution of 
Rana’s place in the world. 
 
These personal experiences of being forcibly labelled as stateless, of statelessness being 
imposed as a key identity marker, were also experienced by Issa on the border between 
the United States and Canada, where he – like Fatima in the UK - applied for asylum to 
receive international protection as a refugee: while having never heard this term before, 
Issa laughingly noted that statelessness “became my identity” from that moment onwards 
(50-year-old born in a refugee camp in Syria. Interview, UK, 2013). Having been a 
Palestinian refugee in Syria, he, like Fatima and Rana, was not only demoted from the 
status of ‘the refugee’ to that of an asylum-seeker by virtue of being outside of the 
Middle East (through a process of what Qasmiyeh refers to as a “reverse 
metamorphosis”),vii but also stripped of his claims to a national identity and interpellated 
as a stateless person.  
 
Given the hierarchy of rights that exist for refugees and stateless persons, it is notable that 
being identified and categorised as a stateless person offers fewer legal rights than 
refugee status (UNHCR 2014:31). In France, in particular, the decision of whether to 
apply for refugee status or apatride status emerged as a defining moment solidifying 
individuals’ awareness of the concept of statelessness. For instance, Mahmoud indicated 
that statelessness is not an organic part of lived identity, but rather an identity marker 
which becomes salient as a result of having to navigate specific immigration and asylum 
procedures: “It is only when one has to engage with those people or when one wants to 
mention to a person who has proceeded with the application to ask for the apatride status 
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or political refugee or another [status], but [otherwise, the term stateless] doesn’t just pop 
up in a discussion…” (26-year-old born in Algeria; interview, France, 2012). In turn, 
Rajab also highlighted the pragmatic, legal meaning of this concept through reference to 
OFPRA: 
 
the first time that it had a practical meaning for me was with Palestinian refugee 
friends who had applied for stateless status (‘demande d’apatridie’). That’s when 
I understood that there was a difference between stateless (‘apatride’) and asylum 
seeker. 
31-year-old born in a refugee camp in Jordan. Interview, France, 2012 
  
Throughout these interviews, references were repeatedly made of Palestinian refugees 
(recognized as such in the Middle East) becoming asylum-seekers or applying for 
stateless status in France or the UK. On a practical level, the geographies of status and of 
identity come to the fore, with particular status and identity markers being associated 
with particular spaces: while Palestinians are thus recognized as ‘Palestine refugees’ 
within UNRWA’s five areas of operation in the Middle East (Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, 
Gaza and the West Bank), their refugee status is not automatically recognized by 
European states. Instead, they become stateless asylum-seekers whose ability to access 
protection in the global North has habitually been undermined due to a mis-application of 
international law (as discussed above).  
 
Although many interviewees thus not only lacked a personal or political identification 
with the term stateless, other labels and categories were repeatedly asserted, including the 
labels of refugee and exile in particular. While acknowledging the concept of 
statelessness, Miriyam stressed that “in the Palestinian context we have other terms that 
are more common […] Exile, diaspora, refugee...” (interview, France, 2012; emphasis 
added). In direct contrast with the personal distancing from the notion of statelessness 
outlined above, many interviewees thus reiterated their ongoing identification with the 
refugeeness they had borne since birth, even if they were, de jure, citizens:  
 
On the one hand I am not [apatride]… juridically… I am French so… I have one 
[patrie]. I have at least one… even with regard to the Palestinian side I don’t 
consider myself apatride…because we have a homeland (patrie) and so…I 
consider myself…I define myself as a refugee, an exile but not as an apatride. 
25-year-old born in France. Interview, France, 2012. Emphasis added 
 
Equally, Saif indicated that, having been naturalised as a Swedish citizen, “my Swedish 
passport means lot to me as a refugee” (interview, Sweden, 2014; emphasis added). Just 
as Sanbar refers to the intergenerational inheritance of the archival memory of and 
commitment to Palestine - “Palestine travelling around on the shoulders of its children” 
(Sanbar 2001:91) - so too does their refugeeness ‘travel’ across not only time and space, 
but also across legal statuses.viii 
In effect, as Qasmiyeh (cited in Qasmiyeh and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013:138) has argued 
elsewhere, 
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becoming a [British] citizen does not exclude or erase the fact that I was born a 
refugee. On the contrary, it is particularly vital for me to remain in contact with 
my history, or perhaps histories, of refugeeness, and the reality that the majority 
of my family are still refugees, and are still inhabitants of different refugee camps 
in Lebanon. How can a son or a brother be a citizen while the rest of his family 
are refugees elsewhere? It is that personal, familial linkage which allows you to 
respond to that history with knowledge and acceptance of the fact that you are 
part of a group. It is not a tribalistic linkage, and yet as a result of being part of 
that place, of that upbringing, your citizenship does not cancel out the refugeeness 
of the other (which is simultaneously part of yourself). 
The overlapping refugeeness of citizens - itself an existential and political declaration of 
belonging to the collective whose status remains pending even when individual security 
has been obtained on a legal level – clearly resonates with the significance of the 
relationship between individual and collective statelessness, and demonstrates the on-
going connections between Palestinian people and places on inter-generational and 
transnational levels alike.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In the context of ever-changing statuses across diverse geographies, which often reflect a 
‘demotion’ from one label and legal status to another, ambivalence towards or resistance 
to ‘the stateless label’ is not a rejection of individual claims to rights and protection, but 
rather a rejection of a series of processes which reinscribe, rather than redress, the 
absence of a demarcated geographical compass. Ultimately, the label ‘stateless’ is not 
perceived as offering protection, but potentially as erasing existing identity markers and 
forms of attachment, and, indeed, of negating the right to self-determination itself, as a 
collective right which would provide both collective and individual remedy to 
disenfranchisement and erasure.  
 
The constellation of labels inscribed by Others and/or embraced by Palestinians, whether 
in isolation or as integral components of hyphenated identities, echo the multiple 
geographies of exclusion and belonging underpinning the (counter)narratives of 
statelessness examined in this article. In spite of (or precisely due to) the acquisition and 
imposition of new bureaucratic labels and the concomitant erasure of meaningful 
signifiers at international borders, in police stations, immigration centres and universities, 
interviewees have simultaneously reasserted and transcended the erasure of a single root 
(Palestine); they have asserted their multiple origins through their intergenerational 
commitment to the Palestinian homeland of the past, present and future, their ‘travelling 
fear’ of the European host states and states of nationality which simultaneously welcome 
and reject them through processes of hostipitality, and a transnational longing for the 
Middle Eastern refugee camps which are condensed spaces of marginalisation, liminality 
and identity (Qasmiyeh and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013). The archives of knowledge and 
identity drawn upon to negotiate these and other labels and spaces, during transitions 
across borders and within thresholds (Derrida 1996; Boulatta 1998; Sanbar 2001), have 
been both embodied and inherited, and yet they remain contested and ambiguous, a 
matter both of existence and of the existential.  
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refugees within the context of the Middle East, including Nabila who was officially recognised as a 
stateless person in France, but rejected being identified as a ‘political refugee”: “the fact that I am 
Palestinian that’s political but I didn’t come to France as a political refugee…and between ‘political 
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2012.)  
